Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump by Siegel, Neil S.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 93 | Issue 1 Article 11
Winter 2018
Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and
President Donald Trump
Neil S. Siegel
Duke Law School, siegel@law.duke.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the President/
Executive Department Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Siegel, Neil S. (2018) "Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President Donald Trump," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 93 : Iss.
1 , Article 11.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol93/iss1/11
 Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President 
Donald Trump 
NEIL S. SIEGEL* 
My big worry is not simply that formal institutions have been eroded, 
but that the informal norms that underpin them are even more 
important and even more fragile. Norms of transparency, conflict of 
interest, civil discourse, respect for the opposition and freedom of the 
press, and equal treatment of citizens are all consistently undermined, 
and without these the formal institutions become brittle.1 
In the wake of the 2016 elections, I was driving near my home in Durham, North 
Carolina, with my eldest daughter, Sydney. She was only twelve years of age at 
the time, but she is an old soul. We were listening to an NPR story about Donald 
Trump, the content of which I cannot recall—there have been so many. When it 
was over, Sydney sighed, turned to me, and said, “You know, Dad. We didn’t break 
the glass ceiling, but we sure seem to be breaking a lot of other things.”  
This Essay is about the other things that President Donald Trump has been 
breaking. I will argue that what is most troubling about the conduct of President 
Trump during and since the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign is not any potential 
violations of the U.S. Constitution or federal law. There likely have been some 
such violations, and there may be more.2 But what is most troubling about 
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 1. Stanford Political Scientist Anna Grzymala-Busse, quoted in Thomas B. Edsall, 
Democracy Can Plant the Seeds of Its Own Destruction, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/opinion/democracy-populism-trump.html [https://perma 
.cc/4SGX-ZP8M]. 
 2. As discussed in this Essay, President Trump’s executive orders on immigration and 
refugees are legally vulnerable. Moreover, multiple pending lawsuits allege that President 
Trump is violating the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause at Article I, Section 9, 
Clause 8. See, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, No. 1:17-
cv-00458, 2017 WL 6524851 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017); Jeffrey Toobin, Behind the 
Democrats’ Emoluments Lawsuit Against Trump, NEW YORKER (June 20, 2017), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/behind-the-democrats-emoluments-lawsuit 
-against-trump [https://perma.cc/Y7J5-ZK67]; Norman L. Eisen, Richard Painter, & Laurence 
H. Tribe, The Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and Application to Donald J. Trump 
(Dec. 16, 2016) (manuscript on file with author). In addition, the President appears to be under 
investigation for obstruction of justice. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Charlie Savage & Maggie 
Haberman, Trump Attacks Rosenstein in Latest Rebuke of Justice Department, N.Y. TIMES 
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President Trump is his disregard of political norms that had previously constrained 
presidential candidates and Presidents, and his flouting of nonlegal but obligatory 
“constitutional conventions” that had previously guided and disciplined occupants 
of the White House. These norms and conventions, although not “in” the 
Constitution, play a pivotal role in sustaining the Constitution. 
Part I discusses political norms and constitutional conventions, including how 
they are alike, how they are different (notwithstanding the tendency of the 
President’s critics to use the terms interchangeably), and why they matter in the 
United States notwithstanding the existence of a written constitution. Part II 
substantiates my claim that President Trump has consistently disrespected 
numerous political norms and constitutional conventions. I will be more than 
suggestive in corroborating my claims, but I will not be able to be comprehensive: 
it would require a longer writing project than a brief Essay to document all of the 
troubling ways in which President Trump has behaved since becoming a candidate 
for President, and the constraints of the publication process do not permit weekly 
updates.3 For example, Peter Baker of the New York Times, in an article taking 
stock of President Trump’s first 100 days in office, wrote the following:  
As Washington pauses to evaluate the opening phase of the Trump 
presidency, the one thing everyone seems to agree on is that, for better 
or worse, the capital has headed deep into uncharted territory. On 
almost every one of these first 100 days, Mr. Trump has done or said 
something that caused presidential historians and seasoned 
professionals inside the Beltway to use the phrase “never before.”4 
This Essay is offered in the spirit of encouraging Americans to insist “never again.”   
Before proceeding, an observation is warranted about what is at stake. The phe-
nomenon of increasing disrespect for political norms and constitutional 
conventions, which President Trump’s conduct embodies but does not exhaust, 
relates to a larger set of questions of great significance: How are we Americans to 
understand our current political predicament? What is happening to us? Both 
                                                                                                                 
 
(June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/politics/trump-investigation-
comey-russia.html [https://perma.cc/6FN2-A8KU] (“Acknowledging for the first time 
publicly that he is under investigation, Mr. Trump appeared to accuse Rod J. Rosenstein, the 
deputy attorney general, of leading what the president called a ‘witch hunt.’”); id. (“‘I am 
being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director!’ 
Mr. Trump wrote [on Twitter], apparently referring to a memo Mr. Rosenstein wrote in May 
that was critical of [James B.] Comey’s leadership at the F.B.I.”).  
 3. Since this Essay was initially drafted, for example, the President mocked a foreign 
leader and threatened nuclear war over Twitter. See, e.g., Editorial, The Republican’s Guide 
to Presidential Etiquette, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2017/10/08/opinion/editorials/republican-etiquette-guide.html [https://perma.cc/J6S9-GDXB]. 
More interesting and significant than the charge of hypocrisy leveled against Republican 
politicians by this editorial is the factually accurate compilation of conduct engaged in by 
President Trump. 
 4. Peter Baker, How Trump Has Reshaped the Presidency, and How It’s Changed Him, 
Too, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/29/us/politics/trump-
presidency-100-days.html [https://perma.cc/JS7G-9JGU].   
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culturally and conceptually, we increasingly find ourselves possessing and acting 
on a view of politics that verges on animus toward, and deep distrust of, the 
political opposition. On that understanding, politics is a realm in which elected 
officials are entitled to indulge their ideological appetites and exercise their wills 
to the full extent that legality permits—they are free to take maximum political 
advantage in every situation. Too often we imagine our polity as being populated 
by people who are so fundamentally alien from us—so essentially “other”—that 
we are more charitably disposed toward a hostile foreign power than toward 
members of the other political party, who cannot be permitted to win the next 
election or make the next Supreme Court appointment because so much is 
perceived to be at stake.5 Increasing disregard of political norms and constitutional 
conventions by candidates and elected officials is one indication that we have lost 
our way, and figuring out how to encourage greater respect for them may help us 
find our way back. But first we need to more fully understand what political norms 
and constitutional conventions are and why they matter.6 
I. POLITICAL NORMS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
Norms can be invoked descriptively or prescriptively. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines the term “norm” descriptively as a “standard or pattern of social 
behaviour that is accepted in or expected of a group.”7 Such social norms may be 
good or bad from a moral perspective. By contrast, when I use the term “political 
norms,” I mean to invoke prescriptive phenomena—specifically, norms of political 
morality. Political norms can be thought of as principles of right action that bind 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, I’m O.K.—You’re Pure Evil, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/17/opinion/sunday/im-ok-youre-pure-evil.html 
[https://perma.cc/T4VG-F56F] (“If not physically then civically, we’re in a dangerous place 
when it comes to how we view, treat and talk about people we disagree with. Ugly partisanship 
may not be new, but some of its expressions and accelerants are.”); Charles J. Sykes, The 
Danger of Ignoring Alex Jones, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
06/17/opinion/sunday/the-danger-of-ignoring-alex-jones.html [https://perma.cc/8GYJ-UXJQ] 
(“It has almost become a cliché that we are a polarized country, but the reality runs deeper. 
We now have a politics deeply infused with paranoia and distrust not only of our institutions 
but also of one another. We do not simply disagree; we are at war. We do not merely differ 
with our opponents on matters of principle or policy; political paranoids believe that we are 
fighting in a twilight struggle for civilization.”). 
 6. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64 
UCLA L. REV. 1728, 1769 (2017) (“Conflict channeled through the role understandings of 
constitutional culture is crucial in directing the growth and sustaining the authority of our 
constitutional law. . . . For conflict to serve these ends, however, it must be constrained. 
Whether we ground these constraints in text, structure, or the unwritten Constitution, or call 
these constraints law, gloss, norms, or conventions, the vitality of these role constraints is key 
to the strength and to the character of a constitutional democracy.”). 
 7. Norm, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2003), http://www.oed.com/view 
/Entry/128266 [https://perma.cc/V4W6-4UFG]. There is a vast academic literature on social 
norms. For a discussion and citations to that literature in several disciplines, see Social Norms, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-norms [https:// 
perma.cc/WPC9-RZR2]. 
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elected officials and serve to guide and control their conduct in office. Political 
norms prescribe standards of behavior that all politicians should agree on and then 
comply with anyway—that is, regardless of whether other politicians comply with 
them. (I therefore mean to exclude immoral norms even though participants in the 
practice view them as morally obligatory.) An example of a political norm is the 
norm that politicians ordinarily should not lie about matters of public interest. 
Among other things, this norm is grounded in the widespread belief that it is wrong 
for elected officials to mislead their constituents and the general public about 
matters that may concern them, at least without serious justification for doing so.8 
Instrumentally, politicians who frequently lie undermine representative 
democracy. Expressively, they impose dignitary harms.9 
Political norms can usefully be contrasted with the game theoretic equilibria 
that are studied by many political scientists and economists.10 Such equilibria 
emerge as solutions to problems of strategic interaction, in which outcomes are 
jointly determined by the actions of all the parties to the interaction. It follows 
that the result of the action of each party depends on the actions of all other 
parties, and the best choice of action for each party depends on what it expects 
all the others to do.11  
One category of problems of strategic interaction are coordination problems—
that is, problems in which the parties to the interaction have at least some 
common interests but multiple solutions are possible.12 An example of a game of 
pure coordination is deciding which side of the street drivers should drive on. It 
does not much matter which side is chosen as long as all drivers choose the same 
side. Another example is deciding who should call back whom when a phone call 
is dropped.  
On a game theoretic account of political behavior, politicians may restrain 
their conduct in certain ways, but they do not do so out of a sense of obligation. 
Rather, they do so in order to avoid criticism and other undesirable consequences 
in light of what others have come to expect. As Richard Fallon writes, “once 
solutions to coordination problems have emerged, adherence to those solutions 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 555, 598 (2010) (“It is wrong to deceive people—and thereby diminish their 
apprehension of the governmental institutions under which they live—in the absence of very 
good reason for doing so.”). 
 9. See id. (distinguishing material and expressive harms caused by deception). 
 10. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens 
of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1115 (2008) (“Equilibria are not 
norms, and I doubt that law could exist in the absence of anyone having a normative 
commitment to obeying it.”). 
 11. There is a vast game theoretic literature in economics and political science. For a 
seminal contribution, see THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). For some 
representative citations and legal applications, see Fallon, supra note 10, at 1113–15 nn.23–
27. Standard teaching texts include DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991); 
ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS (1992); and MARTIN J. OSBORNE, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (2003). 
 12. For a lucid and analytically precise discussion, see Gerald J. Postema, Coordination 
and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 172–75 (1982). 
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on the part of some, maybe many, can be explained by the adverse consequences 
that a deviation would predictably provoke.”13  
Political conventions find their conceptual space between poli tical norms on 
the one hand and game theoretic equilibria on the other. Like political norms and 
unlike equilibria, political conventions impose obligations—not simply costs for 
deviation—on politicians.14 Potentially unlike political norms and like equilibria, 
political conventions serve the long-term interests of the parties to the 
conventions and help solve coordination and other problems,15 and they are 
followed in significant part because politicians followed them in the past and 
others do so in the present.16 Also unlike political norms and like equilibria, 
political conventions may have elements of rational arbitrariness to them, as 
illustrated immediately below. They are therefore morally more contingent than 
political norms. Political conventions exist when social facts regarding the past 
practices and beliefs of elected officials give rise to obligations.17 They are 
derived, at least in part, from the historical practices of governmental institutions.  
A likely historical example of a political convention, and one that was likely 
characterized by some rational arbitrariness, was the prohibition, prior to 
adoption of the 22nd Amendment in 1951, against Presidents serving more than 
two terms. Norms of political morality did not appear to firmly fix the 
appropriate number of terms at two rather than at one or three, but George 
Washington stepped down after two, and it was generally thought thereafter that 
it would be improper to deviate from his example. A number of Presidents 
considered running for a third term, however, and President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt (FDR) ran successfully for a third and then a fourth term. Ratification 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. Fallon, supra note 10, at 1115. 
 14. See, e.g., A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 422 (London, MacMillan & Co. 10th ed. 1960) (conceiving of constitutional 
conventions, a special category of political conventions discussed below, as specifying how 
discretionary governmental power “ought to be exercised”); Keith E. Whittington, The Status 
of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1860 
(explaining that constitutional conventions may be understood “as maxims, beliefs, and 
principles that guide officials in how they exercise political discretion”).  
 15. David Lewis famously took the view that conventions are coordination devices that 
people follow largely out of self-interest. See DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
STUDY (1969). Political conventions are importantly different from “Lewis conventions” in 
that political conventions generate obligations of compliance. 
 16. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hart’s Posthumous Reply, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2096, 
2100–01 (2017) (stating that to have accepted a rule “as convention” is to have accepted the 
rule “because others so accepted it”).  
 17. Exactly how social facts give rise to obligations, and whether normative (or value) 
facts are also needed for such obligations to arise, is a difficult question that divides positivists 
and antipositivists. For discussions, see generally Postema, supra note 12; Mark Greenberg, 
How Facts Make Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 157 (2004); Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact 
Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288 (2014); Nicos Stavropoulos, The Debate That Never Was, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 2082 (2017). For one exploration of the circumstances in which 
constitutional conventions give rise to obligations, see Joseph Jaconelli, Do Constitutional 
Conventions Bind?, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 149, 168–75 (2005); see also infra note 48 (discussing 
Jaconelli’s argument). 
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of the 22nd Amendment, which legally limited Presidents to two terms, likely 
signified that FDR had contravened the convention (or, perhaps, had availed 
himself of an emergency exception to it), not that it had never existed.18 
The political convention against Presidents serving more than two terms was 
likely an example of a special kind of convention: a constitutional convention. 
Unlike conventions generally, constitutional conventions advance a purpose of 
the Constitution, such as limiting presidential power in order to prevent 
dictatorship.19 To act contrary to a constitutional convention, as Keith 
Whittington observes, “is to violate the spirit of the constitution, even if it does 
not violate any particular rule.”20 British commentator Albert Venn Dicey, 
writing during the late nineteenth century, likewise viewed constitutional 
conventions as related to constitutional purpose. Under Dicey’s account, 
violating a constitutional convention is considered a breach of “constitutional 
morality.”21 Put differently, to violate a constitutional convention is to engage in 
behavior that is anticonstitutional, as opposed to unconstitutional. 
When American audiences are told about the importance of “constitutional 
conventions” in the United States, people often think that the reference is either 
to the 1787 gathering of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution in Philadelphia or 
to one textually specified mechanism of proposing or ratifying constitutional 
amendments.22 These are two meanings of the term, and they are the dominant 
ones in the United States. They are not the only meanings of the term in America, 
however, nor are they the primary meaning in Commonwealth legal systems. In 
such systems, rather, constitutional conventions are as described above: they are 
principles of proper governmental behavior that are derived, at least in part, from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. For a discussion, see Jaconelli, supra note 17, at 167–68; see also Joseph Jaconelli, 
The Nature of Constitutional Convention, 19 LEGAL STUD. 24, 33 (1999) (suggesting that 
the constitutional convention could be read as subject to an exception in circumstances of 
emergency, so that FDR could be understood as having acted within the terms of the 
convention). 
 19. Difficult conceptual questions concern the extent to which the preconditions for the 
existence of a constitutional convention are empirical or normative. My understanding is 
that the political actors in past instances need to have understood themselves as having been 
acting, at least in part, out of a sense of obligation, but they do not need to have thought that 
in doing so they were vindicating a purpose of the Constitution. That is a separate normative 
requirement that the analyst must assess in determining whether a constitutional convention 
is at stake. Such a view appears compatible with the classic formulation of Sir Ivor Jennings, 
who identified three questions that must be answered when seeking to establish the 
existence of a constitutional convention: “[F]irst, what are the precedents; secondly, did the 
actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason 
for the rule?” W. IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 136 (5th ed. 1959). For 
criticism of the focus of Jennings and other scholars on precedents, see Andrew D. Heard, 
Recognizing the Variety Among Constitutional Conventions, 22 CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 63, 
71 (1989) (“Precedents are not some independent source from which conventional rules are 
created. A rule is only created by the existence of a general consensus in the political 
community.”). 
 20. Whittington, supra note 14, at 1852. 
 21. DICEY, supra note 14, at 346. 
 22. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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the historical practices of governmental institutions and that advance a purpose of 
the constitution.23  
British (and, more broadly, Commonwealth) legal and political theorists, not 
American scholars, coined the term “constitutional conventions.”24 And it may be 
tempting to assume that a basic difference between the constitutional regimes in 
England and the United States is that constitutional conventions play a prominent 
role only there and not here. Unlike England, the United States has a written, 
mostly judicially enforced Constitution, which causes many American lawyers, 
judges, citizens, and legal scholars to assume that there are only two categories of 
potential interest: the constitutional, which is conceived of as limiting 
governmental action, and the political, which is conceived of as licensing 
government officials to indulge their appetites and exercise their wills to whatever 
extent they wish within the bounds of the law.25  
As illustrated by the historical example of the two-term presidency, however, 
the constitutional regime in the United States is normatively more complex than 
that: like England and other Commonwealth countries, the United States has 
constitutional conventions.26 For example, under the practice that has grown up 
around the electoral college method of electing the President, registered voters vote 
for electors, and then the electors vote for President. Most Americans would be 
surprised to learn that the Constitution is not generally thought by experts to entitle 
registered voters to participate in the process at all by casting votes for presidential 
electors. The first section of Article II provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in 
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”27 
Yet it would be unthinkable today, except perhaps in extraordinary circumstances, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. In addition to past practices, other potential sources of constitutional conventions 
include special agreements and broad constitutional principles. See Heard, supra note 19, at 
66–67 (writing that, in addition to viewing “precedent” and “special agreement” as potential 
sources of constitutional conventions, “[w]here an unprecedented situation arises, it is to the 
basic principles of the constitution that we must turn”). 
 24. Although most scholars tend to associate the concept of constitutional conventions 
with Dicey’s work during the late nineteenth century, the idea long predates Dicey. See Janet 
McLean, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Constitutional Propriety, 11 N.Z. J. 
PUB. & INT’L L. 19, 22 (2013) (so observing and tracing the idea in the work of Hobbes, Locke, 
Burke, Austin, Mill, and Hart); O. Hood Phillips, Constitutional Conventions: Dicey’s 
Predecessors, 29 MOD. L. REV. 137 (1966). 
 25. Herbert Wechsler’s distinction between the principled realm of judicial decision and 
the unprincipled realm of political decision still resonates among constitutional law scholars. 
See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
15 (1959) (“[W]hether you are tolerant, perhaps more tolerant than I, of the ad hoc in politics, 
with principle reduced to a manipulative tool, are you not also ready to agree that something 
else is called for from the courts? I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial process 
is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is 
involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result 
that is achieved.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional 
Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 265–68 (2017) 
(discussing constitutional conventions on both sides of the Atlantic).  
 27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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for a state legislature to appoint a slate of electors instead of allowing its registered 
voters to participate.28 
Another constitutional convention also concerns the Electoral College. The 
Constitution is not generally thought by experts to prohibit members of the 
Electoral College from ignoring the popular vote for President in the states that 
appoint them. Yet the overwhelming majority of electors throughout American 
history have not felt free to ignore the popular vote and cast their ballots for the 
candidate they personally prefer.29 That convention came under pressure in the 
wake of the November 2016 presidential election, but Americans who sought to 
persuade electors to prevent the election of Donald Trump did not make much 
headway.30 
Other constitutional conventions govern the proper relationship between the po-
litical branches and the Supreme Court. The Constitution is not generally thought 
by experts to prohibit a political party in control of Congress from expanding the 
size of the U.S. Supreme Court in order to pack it with partisan Justices. Yet any 
such plan to increase the size of the Court would likely encounter intense bipartisan 
opposition. That is what happened in 1937, when FDR, a Democrat, tried to pack 
the Court in response to conservative Supreme Court decisions that were thwarting 
his New Deal economic recovery plans, which sought to move the country out of 
the Great Depression. The Democrat-controlled Senate Judiciary Committee 
vigorously opposed FDR’s Court-packing plan on the ground that it was an attack 
on the constitutional structure—on judicial independence. What is especially 
interesting about the Senate hearings on the plan is the extent to which it was not 
clear whether certain witnesses who opposed the plan were invoking constitutional 
conventions or structural constitutional constraints. Some witnesses tacked back 
and forth between the two kinds of arguments.31 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. During the contested election of 2000 between George W. Bush and Al Gore, there 
was serious talk about the Florida Legislature appointing a slate of Bush electors if the 
recount generated a Gore majority. See, e.g., Jo Becker & Peter Slevin, Fla. Legislature 
Could Pick Slate of Electors, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2000), http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/wp-srv/onpolitics/elections/electors18.htm [https://perma.cc/V4LV-PETE]. But such talk 
appeared to reflect a dispute over the process that should be used to discern which candidate 
registered voters had in fact voted for, not over whether registered voters should be allowed 
to participate at all. 
 29. HERBERT W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7 (1925) 
(observing that the United States, like Great Britain, has various “customs, practices, 
maxims and precepts which are not enforced by the courts, and which thus correspond to 
the English [constitutional conventions],” and pointing as an example to “the understanding 
that Presidential Electors shall not cast their votes according to their independent judgment 
but shall do no more than formally ratify the results of a previous popular vote”).   
 30. See, e.g., Kyle Cheney, Democratic Presidential Electors Revolt Against Trump: 
The Electoral College Could See a Historic Number of “Faithless Electors”, POLITICO 
(Nov. 22, 2016, 5:09 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/democrats-electoral-
college-faithless-trump-231731 [https://perma.cc/L7WU-RULM]. 
 31. For a discussion, see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 26, at 269–87. David Pozen has 
suggested that there is a convention against Court packing. See David E. Pozen, Self-Help 
and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 34, 69 (2014).  
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A few liberal legal academics in the United States have recently floated the 
idea of packing the Court with a liberal Justice as soon as the Democratic Party 
regains control of the White House and the Senate. Such liberals claim that this 
is a justifiable way to take back the seat that was “stolen” from the Democratic 
Party when Senate Republicans took the extraordinary, unprecedented step of 
refusing to consider President Barack Obama’s nomination of D.C. Circuit Chief 
Judge Merrick Garland to replace Justice Antonin Scalia.32 Trump nominee Neil 
Gorsuch now occupies that pivotal seat. Even if one believes, as I do, that Senate 
Republicans behaved improperly, any talk of Court packing may be politically 
unwise,33 and—more to the point—actually doing it might strike another blow to 
the health of the constitutional system by exacerbating a destructive race to the 
normative bottom.34  
Turning from Court packing to “Court stripping,” the text of the 
Constitution—specifically, Article III, Section 2—can be read as giving 
Congress wide authority to strip the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction 
to hear certain categories of cases. Yet actual instances of Court stripping are 
extraordinarily rare and any plan to do so would likely meet strong bipartisan 
objections notwithstanding strong criticisms of particular Supreme Court 
decisions by conservatives and liberals alike.35 
Even accounting for anger over the previous election and (in my view) the 
mistreatment of Chief Judge Garland, the response of most Americans to most 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Opinion, In the Future, John Roberts Could Be the 
Supreme Court’s Swing Vote, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/ 
op-ed/la-oe-hasen-roberts-swing-vote-20170410-story.html [https://perma.cc/RSN6-VJKB] 
(“The only real solution is for Democrats to pray for the current justices’ good health—and 
then to take back the presidency and the Senate. And once they do, perhaps they’ll play 
hardball themselves by increasing the number of justices on the court and packing it with 
liberals.”). At the Indiana symposium mentioned in the star note to this Essay, Mark Tushnet 
argued in favor of Court packing to take back the allegedly stolen seat. See Mark Tushnet, 
Expanding the Judiciary, the Senate Rules, and the Small-c Constitution, BALKINIZATION 
(Nov. 25, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/expanding-judiciary-senate-rules-
and.html [https://perma.cc/FF6W-M4F4] (“I think—really, I do think this—that Democrats 
should be thinking about the possibility of expanding the Court’s size to 11 as soon as they 
get the chance (if they ever do).”) 
 33. Republicans are much closer than Democrats to having the raw power to pack the 
Court now, so it is not clear why liberals would want to emphasize to Republicans that there 
are literally no normative constraints on their doing so. Nor is it clear why liberals would want 
to estop themselves from being able to claim the normative high ground and assail such a 
packing scheme in the court of public opinion in the event it were to materialize. And once 
Democrats or Republicans succeeded in packing the Court, there might be no end of 
unpacking, packing again, jurisdiction stripping, and perhaps even judicial impeachments on 
political grounds. 
 34. Disrespect for constitutional conventions cuts both ways ideologically. It is at best 
awkward for liberals to decry such disrespect by President Trump and Senate Republicans at 
the same time that they call for Court packing.  
 35. For a discussion, including of the possibility that the convention against Court 
stripping is constitutional in stature (which is the most recently stated view of the Office of 
Legal Counsel), see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 26, at 287–312.  
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or all of the above scenarios would likely be that “you just can’t do that,” or 
“that’s just wrong,” even if they would not know exactly why. Their intuitions 
are most plausibly justified by unwritten constitutional conventions that limit the 
political discretion of state legislators, presidential electors, Presidents, and 
members of Congress. These conventions are important because they facilitate 
democratic self-government, and because they protect judicial independence. 
One might question whether constitutional conventions can be said to exist in 
the United States if they are not necessarily widely recognized as constitutional 
conventions. It turns out, however, that they can operate in a similarly subtle 
fashion in Commonwealth legal systems. For example, New Zealand legal 
scholar Janet McClean has observed that constitutional conventions are typically 
expressed when—not before—they are challenged:  
The fact that emerging practice has not yet been described by the 
political actors as the operation of constitutional convention is not 
evidence against the existence of such a convention. Constitutional 
conventions are, after all, commonly “articulated after the fact” . As 
they usually operate, constitutional conventions perform a rather neat 
trick. They are said to represent deeply held and widely shared 
understandings—and yet such understandings are often only 
articulated at the moment at which they have been placed in doubt. 
What really tests the existence of a convention is a crisis.36  
A good example of the phenomenon McClean describes is the constitutional 
crisis of 1937 in the United States, discussed above. So it is not true that 
Commonwealth systems have constitutional conventions and the United States 
has only a written constitution. The existence of a written constitution in the 
United States does not necessarily crowd out the existence of unwritten 
constitutional conventions.  
Professor Michael Dorf has expressed the concern, however, that America’s 
written Constitution makes it difficult to formulate freestanding claims based 
upon historical practice.37 “Because of the widespread but mistaken belief that 
the Constitution alone grounds legal authority,” he contends, “political actors 
feel the need to search for a constitutional hook for arguments that customary 
rules should be obeyed.”38 In Dorf’s view, this search for a textual tie has 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. McClean, supra note 24, at 25. McClean’s observation is a general feature of 
customary law and norms. If a community is following a practice without deviation, there is 
no opportunity to know whether, in what way, or to what extent it is understood to be 
obligatory. It is only when there are breaches that this articulation becomes important. This is 
true of conventions, constitutional conventions, historical gloss, customary international law, 
and customary domestic law. It is a general point about customary law and norms and their 
identification. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law Adjudication as 
Common Law Adjudication, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING 
WORLD 57 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016).  
 37. See Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the 
Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 69, 75 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009).  
 38. Id.  
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“lamentable consequences” in part because “for some customary rules, there is no 
readily available hook, and as a consequence, political actors may be tempted to 
violate them.”39  
Dorf’s concern has truth to it, but it may be overstated. (Indeed, Dorf himself 
voices the concern with appropriate circumspection.) As noted, there are examples 
of constitutional conventions in the United States, both historically and today, and 
Part III will identify other potential constitutional conventions. Moreover, as 
evident in the debate over Court packing in 1937, constitutional interpreters in the 
American tradition can marry conventional claims to legal arguments—
specifically, to structural constitutional arguments. Unlike textual arguments, 
structural arguments do not focus on particular provisions of constitutional text. 40 
Instead, structural arguments are thought to underlie the text; they draw inferences 
from the institutions, and relationships among institutions, that the Constitution 
creates, emphasizing the purposes or functions of the Constitution as a whole or of 
some important part.41  
That said, it does appear true that the written, mostly judicially enforced 
character of the U.S. Constitution leads to constitutional conventions being under-
enforced by elected officials and underappreciated by scholars. That tendency is 
exacerbated under current conditions of increased political polarization and ill 
will.42 For example, political underenforcement of conventions is arguably what 
we have seen in recent years in the context of the Senate’s handling of judicial 
nominations. A Democratic Senate ended the filibuster for lower federal court 
nominees in 2013 after alleging unprecedented Republican obstruction.43 A 
Republican Senate did the same for Supreme Court nominees in 2017 in order to 
overcome a Democratic filibuster of Republican nominee Neil Gorsuch.44 As 
discussed above, Senate Republicans so acted after holding Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s seat open for roughly a year in order to prevent Democratic President 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. Id.  
 40. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 26, at 264–65 (making this point); see also Curtis A. 
Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 
1213, 1230 n.77 (2015) (“It is possible, however, that certain customary practices assume 
constitutional status as claims on the constitutional structure, which are asserted to supplement 
the text.”).  
 41. For discussions of structural reasoning in constitutional law, see JACK M. BALKIN, 
LIVING ORIGINALISM 142 (2011); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 74–92 (1982).  
 42. See, e.g., Philip Bump, Political Polarization Is Getting Worse. Everywhere., WASH. 
POST, (Apr. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/04/09/ 
polarization-is-getting-worse-in-every-part-of-politics [https://perma.cc/ASF7-PWMW]; 
supra note 5 (quoting commentators who describe the phenomenon of ill will as distinct from, 
and in addition to, the phenomenon of polarization).  
 43. Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-
to-limit-use-of-filibuster.html [https://perma.cc/7K64-428Z]. 
 44. Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy “Nuclear Option” to Clear Path for 
Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-
gorsuch-supreme-court-senate.html [https://perma.cc/X7RD-PYRD]. 
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Barack Obama from filling the vacancy by appointing Chief Judge Garland.45 It 
remains to be seen whether and when it will again be possible to fill a vacancy 
on the Supreme Court when the same political party does not control both the 
White House and the Senate.  
That is a potentially serious problem because the Supreme Court is not like 
other courts. Among other things, it plays a unique role in ensuring uniformity 
on important questions of federal law, and an even number of Justices on a 
closely divided Court impairs its ability to execute that responsibility. The Court 
ends up accepting fewer cases, splitting 4-4 on some of the cases it does accept 
(thereby not establishing a precedent), and deciding some cases very narrowly in 
order to avoid such splits (thereby offering little guidance).46 Moreover, judges 
from other courts cannot sit by designation in order to break ties, nor could 
visiting judges provide the kind of guidance and stability that the legal, political, 
and financial systems require.  
Such recent experience speaks to an additional reason why constitutional 
conventions are normatively desirable in the United States. When they are 
respected, they help the U.S. government function at least tolerably well by 
keeping partisanship within reasonable bounds. And they keep partisanship 
within reasonable bounds by discouraging elected officials from pushing their 
legal powers to their respective maxima.47 The system cannot function 
satisfactorily when elected officials do that.48 
The U.S. Constitution brought into being a robust system of separation of 
powers and checks and balances. The Framers fashioned such a horizontal 
constitutional structure without anticipating political parties, let alone the 
ideological parties in existence today but absent throughout most of the twentieth 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. Mike DeBonis, Judge Dashes Merrick Garland’s Final, Faint Hope for a Supreme 
Court Seat, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/powerpost/wp/2016/11/18/judge-dashes-merrick-garlands-final-faint-hope-for-a-supreme-
court-seat [https://perma.cc/SN2M-6CCT]. 
 46. E.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Harm in the GOP’s Pseudo-Principled Supreme Court 
Stance, HILL (Apr. 15, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/276462-
the-harms-in-being-pseudo-principled-about-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/34DF-
E5XE]. 
 47. A difficult question is when the behavior of some politicians renders a 
constitutional convention no longer applicable or no longer obligatory. For example, does 
one political party’s political obstructionism in refusing to move judicial appointments 
along justify or excuse abolition of the filibuster? The question is made more difficult by 
predictable partisan disagreement over whether an unprecedented amount of obstructionism 
has occurred.  
 48. Much more scholarly work needs to be done to develop this point. For one effort, 
see generally Neil S. Siegel, Sustaining Collective Self-Governance and Collective Action: 
A Constitutional Role Morality for Presidents and Members of Congress, 107 GEORGETOWN 
L.J. (forthcoming 2018). For relevant thinking, see Jaconelli, supra note 17, at 169–71 
(identifying the source of an obligatory basis for constitutional conventions as their mode 
of emergence, and adopting a Humean analysis according to which “the party that is in 
power at the moment respects the constraints that are imposed on it by constitutional 
conventions in the expectation that the opposition parties, when they attain office, will 
likewise respect the same constraints”). 
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century. This regime of separation of powers, which is often characterized by the 
separation of parties in control of different parts of the government, 49 creates 
ample opportunity to thwart potential action by the federal government. As a 
result, troubling questions arise regarding how the federal government is to 
execute its basic responsibilities of filling executive and judicial offices, solving 
problems that the states are not well-situated to address on their own,50 and 
safeguarding rights through the passage and updating of civil rights legislation 
(which several constitutional provisions authorize Congress to do).51 
To be sure, a number of heated political disagreements in America today are 
in part precisely about how much action the federal government should be taking. 
It also seems true, however, that Americans of most ideological stripes want the 
federal government to be able to act effectively, even if they disagree about the 
spheres or direction in which such effective action should take place.52 (Demands 
for a robust federal response to the latest natural disaster, whether in red states 
or blue states, bring this point home.) And the federal government cannot 
function effectively if Presidents or political parties in control of Congress push 
to the legal limits their powers to, for example, veto legislation, nominate 
aggressive partisans, decline to nominate people to fill key positions, filibuster 
executive or judicial branch nominees or legislation, and deny confirmation 
hearings or votes (or not consider nominees at all).53 It is thus shortsighted to 
view constitutional conventions as protecting members of only one political 
party and not the other.54 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. For the seminal contribution, see generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, 
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312 (2006).  
 50. Such problems are characteristically multistate collective action problems. See 
generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General 
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2010) (articulating the structural theory 
of collective action federalism); cf. Jane Mansbridge, On the Importance of Getting Things 
Done, 45 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 1, 5 (2012) (“In a more heavily interdependent world, a 
democracy needs more collective power to solve the growing number of collective action 
problems.”).  
 51. The structural logic of the federal government’s role in protecting civil rights is 
distinct from the logic of collective action. See Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism 
and Its Discontents, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1937, 1948 (2013) (noting that the enforcement clauses 
of the Civil War Amendments “give Congress authority to regulate the internal policy 
choices of state governments concerning certain subject matters regardless of collective 
action problems facing the states”). 
 52. See generally Neil S. Siegel, None of the Laws But One, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 1055 
(2014) (arguing that the two political parties disagree less over the constitutional scope of 
federal power than over the political objectives that robust federal power will be used to 
accomplish, and providing numerous examples of congressional Republicans favoring the 
assertive exercise of federal power).  
 53. Consensus-forcing devices like the filibuster are consistent with the need for the 
federal government to function effectively (and serve other valuable purposes, see infra note 
123 and accompanying text) when members of both political parties are willing to negotiate 
in good faith over nominations and bills.  
 54. That said, policing violations of political norms and constitutional conventions can 
be in tension with pursuing a legislative agenda in the short run, which may help explain 
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Constitutional conventions, when they are honored, help vindicate basic 
purposes of the constitutional system—purposes that law alone cannot accomplish. 
Such conventions are not in the written Constitution, but they are deeply connected 
to the Constitution. Violating constitutional conventions does not simply constitute 
bad policy. Disregarding them, at least absent sufficient reason to conclude that 
they have become outdated or that the stakes are too high to respect them,55 
amounts to a deviation from norms of good institutional citizenship that help 
sustain the constitutional system. 
II. PRESIDENT TRUMP’S VIOLATIONS OF POLITICAL NORMS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTIONS 
Even as judged by the lower standards of polarized times, President Trump 
stands alone. No one else in recent memory has approached the degree of his 
disregard of political norms and constitutional conventions. Some of what follows 
risks seeming blunt, but the objective of this Part and the next one is to be objective, 
not neutral. Donald Trump entered political life by relentlessly pushing 
“birtherism,” the arguably racist lie that Barack Obama, the nation’s first African-
American President, was not a natural-born American citizen and so was 
constitutionally barred from serving as President.56 President Trump is no ordinary 
politician. 
An objection worth anticipating at the outset is that the criticism to follow is 
opportunistic. Like the rhetoric of judicial activism, which often masks substantive 
objections to judicial decisions in process objections,57 current talk by liberals of 
norm violations by President Trump may seem less genuine and procedural in 
nature, and more partisan and substantive. With respect to what is motivating 
liberals, the answer is likely that it is a mixed bag of motivations. It is worth noting, 
however, that it is not just liberals who have expressed serious concerns about the 
President’s conduct, including (among many other things) his seeming inability to 
resist further inflaming public sentiment over the outrages perpetrated by white 
                                                                                                                 
 
why congressional Republicans were generally more critical of President Trump’s behavior 
before the election than they have been since.  
 55. The great classics of political morality tend to emphasize the high stakes of politics in 
contrast to ordinary private moral life. See NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Tim Parks 
trans., 2009) (1532); MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGY 77–128 (Hans H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., 1946) (1919); Thomas 
Nagel, Ruthlessness in Public Life, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 75–91 (Stuart 
Hampshire ed., 1978); Michael Walzer, The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
160 (1973). Although there is truth to the conviction that sometimes the stakes are so high in 
politics that even venerable norms and conventions must give way, this view can easily be 
overstated or misused to rationalize troubling behavior by politicians. Moreover, the 
constitutional system cannot survive claims of continuous, across the board, emergency with 
respect to almost every issue. 
 56. Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump Clung to “Birther” Lie for Years, and Still Isn’t 
Apologetic, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/politics/ 
donald-trump-obama-birther.html [https://perma.cc/B52F-H3XB].  
 57. See generally Siegel, supra note 8 (making this point).  
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supremacists in Charlottesville, Virginia.58 Moreover, even if certain objections are 
opportunistic, it does not mean that the problem to which they refer is not real.59  
A. Political Norms 
What follows is a partial list of political norms that Trump has violated. 
Notwithstanding norms of respect for human dignity that in the United States were 
purchased at the cost of enormous human suffering and are still being paid for, 
Candidate Trump indulged in racism, misogyny, Islamophobia, and mockery of the 
disabled in ways that are extraordinary in contemporary American politics.60 Hate 
groups, hate crimes, and other hate-filled speech and actions against racial, ethnic, 
and religious minorities—including in public schools—have risen since he 
declared his candidacy for President. American Latinos, Muslims, Jews, and 
members of the LGBTQ community have been among the targets.61 Also targeted 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. Conservative critics of President Trump’s conduct include David Brooks, Ross 
Douthat, Erik Erikson, Michael Gerson, and William Kristol. They also include Republican 
members of Congress. See, e.g., Miranda Green, GOP Members of Congress Criticize Trump’s 
Comments: “We Should Never Hesitate To Call Out Hate”, CNN (Aug. 16, 2017), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2017/08/15/politics/congress-reaction-trump-comments-paul-ryan/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/4GM7-HRSD] (“Members of Congress in President Donald Trump’s own 
party were among those lawmakers quick to criticize comments the President made in a news 
conference that laid blame[] on both sides of protesters at a rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, 
that turned violent over the weekend.”). Senators John McCain, Bob Corker, and Jeff Flake 
are especially noteworthy for their criticism of President Trump’s behavior, as is former 
President George W. Bush. See Peter Baker, Without Saying “Trump,” Bush and Obama 
Deliver Implicit Rebukes, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/10/19/us/politics/george-bush-trump.html [https://perma.cc/4RNQ-HYKY]; Manu 
Raju, Corker: Trump Criticism Had Been “Building for Some Time,” CNN (Oct. 16, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/16/politics/bob-corker-trump/index.html [https://perma.cc 
/XEP9-DSLS]; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Jeff Flake, a Fierce Trump Critic, Will Not Seek Re-
election for Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017 
/10/24/us/politics/jeff-flake-arizona.html [https://perma.cc/XEP9-DSLS]; McCain Condemns 
“Half-Baked Spurious Nationalism” in Speech, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://apnews.com/021cf4d4bef645f9a30114de813f6e97/McCain-condemns-'half-baked,-
spurious-nationalism'-in-speech [https://perma.cc/PZG9-7CL9]. 
 59. If the question is whether we can be confident that liberal politicians, commentators, 
and scholars really believe in political norms and constitutional conventions just because they 
are invoking them against President Trump, the answer is perhaps not—that may be an 
example of cheap talk. But if they were willing to do something more costly, the commitment 
would be more credible. 
 60. See, e.g., David Perry, Opinion, Trump’s Not Just Racist and Sexist. He’s Ableist, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-perry-trump-
ableism-20161017-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/35NE-VRJ2]; An Open Letter from 
Constitutional Law Scholars to President-Elect Donald Trump, (Dec. 8, 2016), 
http://acslaw.org/sites/default/files/pdf/ACS%20Open%20Letter%20to%20President-Elect.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GPH8-GEY3] [hereinafter “Letter from Constitutional Law Scholars”].  
 61. See, e.g., Alexis Okeowo, Hate on the Rise after Trump’s Election, NEW YORKER 
(Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/hate-on-the-rise-after-trumps-
election [https://perma.cc/E2XC-DMPS]; Mark Potok, Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Surged Last 
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have been Americans of all races and religions who have opposed expressions of 
hate, including in Charlottesville.62 
Notwithstanding norms of respect for freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press, Candidate Trump displayed uncommon hostility toward the news media. He 
denied access to his campaign events to media outlets that he perceived as 
antagonistic, threatened to sue journalists, and called for changes to the nation’s 
libel laws that would hinder the ability of the media to report on matters of public 
importance.63  
As President, Trump has persisted with his attempts to delegitimize—not simply 
to strongly criticize—mainstream members of the fourth branch of government.64 
In addition to regularly describing the news media as composed of “dishonest 
people” who spread “fake news,”65 he also indicated that he would blame the media 
in addition to the courts in the event of a terrorist attack on the asserted ground that 
the media had been underreporting terrorist attacks.66 He offered no evidence to 
substantiate this accusation and there appears to be none, which is unsurprising 
because the media lacks any incentive to underreport attacks. He also called the 
news media “the enemy of the . . . people,” a phrase that Soviet leader Nikita 
                                                                                                                 
 
Year, Fueled by Hateful Campaign, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Nov. 14, 2016), https:// 
www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/11/14/anti-muslim-hate-crimes-surged-last-year-fueled-
hateful-campaign [https://perma.cc/X6ZJ-XDZE]; Hate Groups Increase for Second 
Consecutive Year as Trump Electrifies Radical Right, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/02/15/hate-groups-increase-second-consecutive-year-
trump-electrifies-radical-right [https://perma.cc/UF6B-WUPE]. 
 62. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, A Hate Crime? How the Charlottesville Car Attack May 
Become a Federal Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13 
/us/politics/charlottesville-sessions-justice-department.html [https://perma.cc/5A57-D8TD] 
(“State law enforcement officials have primary jurisdiction to prosecute James Alex Fields Jr., 
20, whom they have charged with second-degree murder in an attack that killed Heather D. 
Heyer, 32, of Charlottesville and injured at least 19 other people. But the [Justice] 
department’s announcement raises the question of whether Mr. Sessions could also seek to 
make it a federal case.”). 
 63. Letter from Constitutional Law Scholars, supra note 60, at 1.  
 64. See, e.g., Jaclyn Reiss, Trump Again Publicly Tells CNN’s Acosta: “You’re Fake 
News,” BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2017/08/14 
/trump-tells-again-publicly-tells-cnn-acosta-you-fake-news/OJhbGg43bwClaAUbAhloBJ 
/story.html [https://perma.cc/Q38H-3TTB?type=image]. 
 65. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 4 (quoting President Trump).  
 66. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Is News of Terror Attacks Underplayed? Experts Say No, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/politics/terrorist-attack-
media-coverage-trump.html [https://perma.cc/5GT8-TW4T] (“‘Pre-emptive blame,’ said 
[Martha] Crenshaw, the Stanford terrorism researcher. ‘Nothing’s happened. But if something 
does happen, he can blame the judiciary and the news media.’”); see also Max Fisher & Kitty 
Bennett, Our Articles on the Attacks Trump Says the Media Didn’t Cover, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/politics/the-white-house-list-of-terror-
attacks-underreported-by-media.html [https://perma.cc/57A6-EW3G] (stating that President 
Trump claims the media is not sufficiently reporting terrorist attacks and providing links to 
media sources that reported on the White House’s list of terrorist attacks from September 2014 
to December 2016). 
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Khrushchev deemed too toxic to use given how Joseph Stalin before him had used 
it to annihilate his critics.67 
Notwithstanding norms against permitting or encouraging foreign meddling in 
U.S. elections, a number of close associates of Candidate Trump appear to have 
had contacts with either Russian officials or Russians with close ties to the Russian 
government.68 Among others, these Trump associates include his son, his son-in-
law, his former campaign chairman, his attorney general, and his former National 
Security Advisor, Michael Flynn, who was forced to resign and is under 
investigation.69 The extent of Mr. Trump’s knowledge or involvement also appears 
to be under investigation, as discussed further in Part II.B. 
Notwithstanding norms of respect for judicial independence, Candidate Trump 
declared that a federal judge presiding over civil litigation to which he was a party 
should recuse himself because he has “an absolute conflict” on account of his 
“Mexican heritage” and Mr. Trump’s promise to “build a wall,” even though the 
case had nothing to do with either the judge’s heritage or Mr. Trump’s immigration 
proposals.70 Consistent with the Judicial Code of Conduct, the judge did not reply 
to Mr. Trump’s attack, which Republican House Speaker Paul Ryan condemned as 
“racist.”71 
As President, Trump has continued to try to undermine public confidence in the 
federal judiciary by disparaging the federal courts and particular federal judges in 
ways that are unprecedented in modern times.72 For example, the President publicly 
asserted that because of a “ridiculous” federal district court decision by a “so-called 
judge” stopping enforcement of his initial executive order on immigration and refu-
gees, “many very bad and dangerous people may be pouring into our country,” and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Baker, supra note 4 (quoting President Trump).  
 68. See, e.g., Zachary Cohen, Kushner Under Fire for Role in Meeting After Trump Jr. 
Email Release, CNN, (July 12, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/12/politics/kushner-
trump-jr-russia-email-chain/index.html [https://perma.cc/7ZSW-JLU2].  
 69. See, e.g., Tom LoBianco & Phil Mattingly, Flynn Providing Documents to Senate, 
First Batch by June 6, CNN, (May 30, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017 
/05/30/politics/michael-flynn-documents-senate/index.html [https://perma.cc/BTK3-DXE8] 
(“Flynn and three other former Trump campaign operatives—former campaign chairman Paul 
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 71. Id.  
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opinion of Jack Goldsmith, head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel under 
President George W. Bush, that “Trump’s serial attacks on judges and the judiciary take us 
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on Judiciary “Demoralizing,” N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
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that the decision “opens up our country to potential terrorists and others that do not 
have our best interests at heart.”73 He also asserted that if the government did not 
win the case, “we can never have the security and safety to which we are entitled.”74 
He then deemed “disgraceful” the appellate hearing before a panel of three judges 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.75 He condemned the panel even 
though it was composed of Republican and Democratic appointees alike who, in 
asking difficult questions of both sides, were each models of professionalism and 
competence.76 The panel was subsequently unanimous in rejecting the 
administration’s position in the appeal.77 
The President’s public antagonism and ad hominem attacks are causing many 
commentators to opine that he is preemptively engaging in blame shifting in the 
event of an attack.78 More disturbingly, a few commentators have expressed the 
concern that the President may be trying to establish a narrative that he can use 
after an attack in order to rally a fearful public into accepting his disregard of 
judicial authority, which would set off a constitutional crisis.79 To be clear, we are 
not anywhere near a crisis at this time, but one is now thinkable in a way that it has 
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in order to safeguard their own public legitimacy.”). 
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of a Terrorist Attack, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
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/06/8e315b78-eca6-11e6-9662-6eedf1627882_story.html [https://perma.cc/TH3Q-QYGP] 
(“President Trump appears to be laying the groundwork to preemptively shift blame for any 
future terrorist attack on U.S. soil from his administration to the federal judiciary, as well 
as to the media.”). 
 79. Paul Krugman, When the Fire Comes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https:// 
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not been for a long time in the United States. Although the courts are currently 
asserting their authority, they will inevitably become more vulnerable after an 
attack, especially a significant one.80  
President Trump’s attacks on judges have not subsided over time, no matter how 
damaging his attacks are to his own stated litigation positions and legal filings. For 
example, while the legal challenge to his second executive order on immigration 
and refugees was pending before the Supreme Court, President Trump unleashed 
a barrage of tweets that, among other things, described the revised order as 
“politically correct” and “watered down,” and as amounting to a “travel ban” after 
all.81 These descriptions reinforced the already strong impression that the President 
had intended to discriminate against foreign nationals on the basis of their 
(Muslim) religion.82 He also tweeted that “the courts are slow and political!”83 
Notwithstanding norms of respect for, and respectful disagreement with, the 
professional judgments of the American intelligence community, President-elect 
Trump likened the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of National Intelligence to “Nazi 
Germany”—to the regime of Adolf Hitler—for unanimously concluding that 
Russian officials directed the hacking of Democratic Party targets during the 
presidential campaign and had contacts with members of the Trump campaign. 84  
Moreover, unlike every prior President of either party over the course of at least 
half a century, President Trump has refused to disjoin public service from private 
interest and so has implicitly attacked the basic distinction between government 
impartiality (that is, “honest government”) and government corruption . President 
Trump represents a merger of public office and private gain. For him, private gain 
has been converted into public office, and so far he has shown no opposition to, 
and apparent enthusiasm for, using public office to reinforce private gain for 
himself, his family, and others who are extraordinarily wealthy. This is evident in 
many contexts. A nonexhaustive list includes: (1) his refusals to divest from his 
business interests;85 (2) his continued implicit cultivation of these interests through 
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regular visits to his properties around the United States;86 (3) his populating the 
White House with family members;87 (4) his populating his cabinet with an 
unprecedented number of billionaires;88 (5) his frequent use of, and the large 
amount of public money spent to secure, his Florida golf club at Mar-a-Lago;89 (6) 
the potential link between his aforementioned refusal to release his tax returns and 
the tax cuts that he pursued (and recently secured) for the wealthy;90 and (7) the 
number and nature of ethics waivers he has awarded to key staffers in his 
administration.91 
Perhaps most troublingly, President Trump utters falsehoods regularly, 
including statements whose falsity is immediately demonstrable.92 Almost all 
politicians spin the truth to some extent, but at least it is the truth they are spinning. 
And politicians do utter false statements on occasion, but President Trump’s 
frequency is so different in degree as to be different in kind. For example, he has 
made demonstrably false claims about: (1) various government statistics, including 
                                                                                                                 
 
/8AX8-YBJY]. 
 86. See, e.g., Karen Yourish & Troy Griggs, Tracking the President’s Visits to Trump 
Properties, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/05/us/ 
politics/tracking-trumps-visits-to-his-branded-properties.html [https://perma.cc/R3GR-
8VPX] (“Ethics experts say Donald J. Trump’s visits to properties owned, managed or branded 
by the Trump Organization amount to free publicity for the company and blur the line between 
his family business and presidential duties.”). 
 87. See, e.g., The Trump Family’s Prominent Roles in the White House, CBS NEWS (May 
1, 2017), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/the-trump-familys-prominent-roles-in-the-white-
house [https://perma.cc/L67M-MM6U].  
 88. See, e.g., Donald Trump’s $14 Billion Cabinet, CBS MONEY WATCH, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/donald-trumps-14-billion-cabinet [https://perma.cc/FR8T-
SASJ] (“President-elect Donald Trump rode the winds of a populist movement into 
Washington, D.C., promising to root out money from politics. Yet when picking his Cabinet 
members, Mr. Trump is surrounding himself with a historic level of wealth that’s at least 50 
times greater than the Cabinet that George W. Bush led.”).  
 89. See, e.g., Trump’s Mar-a-Lago Trips Cost Taxpayers About $10 Million So Far, CBS 
NEWS (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-trump-mar-a-lago-trips-cost-
taxpayers-millions [https://perma.cc/SH9Q-PRUH] (“Budget watchdogs are criticizing the 
cost of President Trump’s visits to Mar-a-Lago, his private club in Palm Beach, Florida. Mr. 
Trump has been at his so-called ‘Winter White House’ the past three weekends. That’s 11 of 
his first 33 days in office. The travel has an estimated price tag of $10 million.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Alan Rappeport, Trump’s Unreleased Taxes Threaten Yet Another 
Campaign Promise, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017 
/04/17/us/politics/tax-code-overhaul-trump.html [https://perma.cc/TD32-VU4F] (“President 
Trump’s promise to enact a sweeping overhaul of the tax code is in serious jeopardy nearly 
100 days into his tenure, and his refusal to release his own tax returns is emerging as a central 
hurdle to another faltering campaign promise.”). 
 91. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Trump White House Grants Waivers of Ethics Rules, 
POLITICO (May 31, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/31/trump-white-house-
waivers-ethics-239011 [https://perma.cc/RZ7Z-FN7Q]. 
 92. See David Leonhardt & Stuart A. Thompson, Opinion, Trump’s Lies, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-lies.html 
[https://perma.cc/XJJ5-CM77] (cataloguing “nearly every outright lie [President Trump] has 
told publicly since taking the oath of office”). 
2018] POLITICAL NORMS  197 
 
those concerning criminality and employment;93 (2) the size of the crowd at his 
inauguration (it was far smaller than he alleged);94 (3) the magnitude of his 
Electoral College victory (it was below average by historic standards);95 (4) voter 
fraud that he repeatedly claimed cost him the popular vote in the election (there is 
no evidence for his assertion that more than three million people voted illegally for 
Hillary Clinton);96 and (5) wire tapping of his communications that he repeatedly 
alleged had been ordered by President Obama (there is no evidence for his claim, 
which would be a major scandal if true).97 And these examples just skim the surface 
of the President’s falsehoods.98 
President Trump’s repeated and persistent denials of truth and defenses of false-
hood are beyond any plausible pale in American politics. A person who launched 
his political career on birtherism still counts “Obama wiretapped me” as an 
“opinion” worth defending and even becoming defensive about when others point 
out to him the absence of any evidence.99 A number of prominent Republicans have 
condemned President Trump for spreading falsehoods in the service of his own 
imagined self-interest.100 In all likelihood, no American living today has witnessed 
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a public official so willing and eager to attack the very existence or relevance of 
truth itself as a category of political life.101 
American constitutional government will be in danger if enough institutions ac-
quiesce in President Trump’s apparent belief that he is entitled to his own facts. 
Imagine the lack of political accountability and unchecked power that would give 
him.102 Yet it is also a serious problem that Americans have little reason to believe 
almost anything he says. Public trust in the President is essential in the event of a 
national crisis regarding which only the President possesses full information and 
to which only the President can respond effectively. As University of Chicago Law 
Professor Eric Posner wrote in criticizing Mr. Trump, “[t]he president’s authority 
rests on trust and discretion, not on triumph of the will.”103  
B. Constitutional Conventions 
President Trump has disregarded more political norms than constitutional con-
ventions. Nonetheless, several instances of his troubling behavior potentially 
qualify as breaches, or attempted breaches, of constitutional conventions. Because 
the relevant practices likely began in social fact before any potential obligation 
attached, they seem like potential candidates for constitutional conventions, as 
opposed to violations of norms that every presidential candidate or president ought 
to have observed from the beginning and should observe regardless of whether 
others do so.  
This Part can only be suggestive, however, because it will not be able to do the 
hard work of establishing the existence and scope of each constitutional 
convention, as well as the level of generality at which the convention should be 
described. Nor will it be able to examine whether relevant circumstances have 
changed to the point that the convention should no longer be respected; like many 
phenomena in law and politics, conventions can rise and fall.104 These are all 
important questions, and American legal scholars are increasingly asking and 
                                                                                                                 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/03/12/mccain-to-trump-
retract-wiretapping-claim-or-prove-it [https://perma.cc/67PH-7RAR].  
 101. See, e.g., Roger Cohen, Opinion, Trump 2020 Is No Joke, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/opinion/donald-trump-2020-roger-cohen 
.html [https://perma.cc/UX75-E6UA] (arguing that, of the many concerning things about 
President Trump, “the frivolous blurring of truth and untruth, fact and falsehood, is the most 
grave,” because “[l]iberty depends on facts” and “disoriented people are more inclined to 
accept a despot as sole font of truth”). 
 102. See Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How To Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 
UCLA L. REV. 78, 153 (2018) (“Democracy requires a shared epistemic foundation. Where 
the state exercises either direct or indirect veto power over the voices aired in the public 
sphere or the factual material therein available, antidemocratic actors and coalitions face 
lower barriers to the consolidation of authority.”). 
 103. Eric Posner, Opinion, Judges v. Trump: Be Careful What You Wish For, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/opinion/judges-v-trump-be-careful-
what-you-wish-for.html [https://perma.cc/8SKF-7P5K].  
 104. A good use of scholarly time would be to think hard about how and why constitutional 
conventions arise in the first place, how and why they are maintained, and how and why they 
decline.  
2018] POLITICAL NORMS  199 
 
attempting to answer them in a variety of settings.105 But this Essay cannot 
substantially contribute to this effort, which would require close engagement 
with historical governmental practices with respect to each area of concern in 
order to determine when the perception of obligation first arose. And even then, 
it might be difficult to determine in particular instances whether one is dealing 
with a political norm or a constitutional convention because they are both related 
and different phenomena. One could certainly quibble with some of the 
categorizing attempted in this Part, although, again, the following are at least 
plausible candidates for constitutional conventions. 
First, President Trump fired the FBI Director, James Comey, who had been 
the federal law enforcement official responsible for investigating potentially 
criminal behavior by members of the President’s inner circle, including the 
President himself. What is more, President Trump fired Mr. Comey at least in 
part because of that investigation. Initially, the Trump administration’s stated 
reason for Mr. Comey’s dismissal was his alleged mishandling of the 
investigation into Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server as Secretary of 
State.106 But President Trump quickly acknowledged what political observers 
already suspected to be the truth: the Russia investigation influenced his decision 
to fire Mr. Comey.107 
Although the FBI director is given a ten-year term by statute in order to 
facilitate his political independence, the prevailing view is that the President 
possesses the legal authority to fire him; for example, it happened once before in 
the case of an FBI director who stood accused of numerous ethical lapses, 
including financial improprieties.108 Legality, however, is neither the point of 
this episode nor of this Essay. It is arguably a constitutional convention in the 
United States that the President permits the executive officers responsible for 
federal criminal law enforcement a very broad range of independence and 
discretion. Structurally, the convention is an important aspect of the executive’s 
maintenance of the rule of law, a task that the Constitution expressly imposes on 
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the President by charging him with taking care that the laws are faithfully 
executed.109  
This constitutional convention plays an obvious role in protecting the actual and 
perceived impartiality of the law. Among other people, the convention protects the 
President’s political opponents. One can thus see why members of both political 
parties would perceive a long-term incentive—and would have since internalized 
an obligation—not to politicize criminal law enforcement. It protects Americans 
who are active in public life when their political party is out of power.  
 It may be less apparent that this constitutional convention protects the 
President, for at least two reasons. First, he retains the authority to ensure that his 
subordinates are acting with vigor and without improper influence, including the 
influence of knowing too much about what the President himself would prefer. 
This both attracts persons of integrity to the relevant positions and enables them to 
execute their responsibilities in good conscience. Second, and critically, as long as 
the President and others observe the convention, he cannot be justly accused of 
trying to corrupt the system of criminal law. (Perhaps this consideration helps 
explain why President Obama, a Democrat, nominated Mr. Comey, a Republican 
known for his independence, for the position.) When the President disrespects the 
constitutional convention of independent criminal law enforcement, Americans all 
lose, including the President—unless, perhaps, he has something to hide.  
Candidate Trump contravened a second arguable constitutional convention that 
seeks to prevent the politicization of federal criminal law enforcement. He 
threatened his political opponent with imprisonment, declaring emphatically 
during a presidential debate that Hillary Clinton “would be in jail” if he were 
President.110 Ari Fleischer, former Press Secretary to President George W. Bush, 
tweeted in response with some understatement: “Winning candidates don’t 
threaten to put opponents in jail. Presidents don’t threaten prosecution of 
individuals. Trump is wrong on this.”111 Nonetheless, Candidate Trump for the 
most part exulted in, and encouraged, crowd chants of “lock her up” during his 
many campaign rallies.112 After the election, he quickly abandoned the idea of 
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prosecuting Clinton, apparently in deference to the very convention he had flouted 
in order to electrify his base and increase his chances of winning the presidency.113 
More recently, however, he has publicly condemned his own attorney general for 
not investigating Clinton.114 
Third, notwithstanding a post-Watergate practice that for forty years had been 
respected by presidential candidates of both parties, Candidate Trump refused to 
release his tax returns. The public was thus unable to learn: (1) whether his personal 
financial connections to Russia helped explain his seemingly inexplicable affinity 
for Russian leader Vladimir Putin; (2) whether Mr. Trump was as successful a 
businessperson as he said he was; (3) the extent to which he has paid taxes and 
made charitable donations; and (4) the extent to which he would benefit personally 
from his proposal to cut taxes significantly on the wealthiest Americans.115 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the President’s refusal to release his tax returns 
would likely have been justified if there were no preexisting practice of presidential 
candidates releasing their returns. But given decades of contrary practice, including 
releases against political interest out of an apparent sense of obligation, there 
appears to be a strong case to be made that Trump violated a constitutional 
convention requiring presidents to release their tax returns.  
For example, 2012 Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney predictably 
was harmed by his release of his tax returns, but he did it anyway. Moreover, he 
deemed Trump’s refusal to follow suit “disqualifying.”116 Romney’s Facebook post 
on the subject illuminates the constitutional purpose served by requiring 
presidential candidates to release their tax returns: 
It is disqualifying for a modern-day presidential nominee to refuse to 
release tax returns to the voters, especially one who has not been 
subject to public scrutiny in either military or public service. Tax 
returns provide the public with its sole confirmation of the veracity of 
                                                                                                                 
 
Supporters Against Clinton, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Nov. 22, 2016), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/22/a-brief-history-of-the-lock-her-up-
chant-as-it-looks-like-trump-might-not-even-try [https://perma.cc/W8VH-6CL4]. 
 113. See id. (“Former New York mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani sounded a similar note. 
‘Look, there’s a tradition in American politics that after you win an election, you sort of put 
things behind you,’ he told reporters at Trump Tower on Tuesday.”). 
 114. See, e.g., Betsy Klein, Trump Slams Sessions, Rips DOJ in Twitter Outburst, CNN 
(July 25, 2017, 11:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/25/politics/donald-trump-jeff-
sessions-hillary-clinton/index.html [https://perma.cc/NZ9C-8LMM] (“President Donald 
Trump lashed out at his attorney general and Justice Department in an extraordinary outburst 
on Twitter Tuesday morning, continuing his public shaming of Jeff Sessions while appearing 
to prod the nation’s top law enforcement official to investigate Hillary Clinton, his 2016 
election opponent.”).  
 115. See, e.g., Greg Sargent, Opinion, This New CNN Scoop Shows the Drip-Drip-Drip of 
Trump’s Russia Scandal Will Continue, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE (May 30, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/05/30/this-new-cnn-scoop-shows-the-
drip-drip-drip-of-trumps-russia-scandal-will-continue [https://perma.cc/KY9A-6N7M]. 
 116. Romney Calls Decision by Trump Not To Release Tax Returns “Disqualifying,” FOX 
NEWS (May 11, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/05/11/romney-calls-decision-
by-trump-not-to-release-tax-returns-disqualifying.html [https://perma.cc/6KJ4-5V85].  
202 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:177 
 
a candidate’s representations regarding charities, priorities, wealth, tax 
conformance, and conflicts of interest. Further, while not a likely 
circumstance, the potential for hidden inappropriate associations with 
foreign entities, criminal organizations, or other unsavory groups is 
simply too great a risk to ignore for someone who is seeking to become 
commander-in-chief.117 
Perhaps in the future Congress will legally require presidential candidates to release 
their returns. 
A fourth potential constitutional convention concerns compliance with estab-
lished practices of vetting executive orders within the executive branch. President 
Trump failed to vet his initial executive order on immigration and refugees, which 
(among other things) barred admission into the United States from seven predomi-
nantly Muslim countries for ninety days and suspended all refugee admissions for 
120 days.118 Contrary to how executive orders are ordinarily crafted—thereby 
disciplining exercises of presidential power and giving courts institutional reasons 
to accord at least some deference to national security judgments by the President—
the affected departments within the executive branch were not consulted and given 
any opportunity to voice objections.119 The order that resulted was poorly drafted 
and legally vulnerable, and the rollout was egregious in the lack of humanity it 
exhibited towards the many individuals and families who were taken by surprise 
while on airplanes, in airports, or abroad.120 Again, perhaps the normative situation 
would be different had the practice of vetting orders and enabling the expression 
of dissent not been firmly established. But given that it was so established, the 
President at least arguably had an obligation to comply with past practice.  
Perhaps relatedly, President Trump seemingly takes or abandons public 
positions on difficult, controversial issues without first consulting experts. 
Consider, for example, his casual invocation of a one-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, an approach that would be at odds with decades of American 
foreign policy.121 Similarly, he briefly suggested, apparently without deliberation 
or consultation, that he might question the “One China policy” to which the United 
States has adhered since the 1970s. He then had to back down as a condition to 
talking with the Chinese government.122 This is not how Presidents of both parties 
have traditionally felt entitled to behave. (Such conduct may, however, simply be 
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unwise or in violation of a political convention, as opposed to a constitutional 
convention.) 
To end on a more positive note, President Trump has advocated the abandonment 
of a fifth arguable constitutional convention—the Senate’s filibuster rule as to legis-
lation—but so far he has not succeeded. It is hard to see how norms of political mo-
rality simply required such a rule from the beginning and regardless of whether the 
opposition party respects it. But the rule is firmly established, having been respected 
for a long time by both political parties when they have been in control of the Senate. 
Moreover, the filibuster serves the arguable constitutional purpose of facilitating 
some meaningful measure of self-governance by electoral losers.123 And although 
political self-interest of course partially explains why the filibuster has survived, it is 
at least plausible to think that more than partisan self-interest underlay Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s firm rejection of President Trump’s suggestion 
that Senate Republicans do away with it.124 
CONCLUSION 
So what, if anything, can be done to enhance respect for political norms and con-
stitutional conventions by elected officials? It is far easier to diagnose the problem 
than it is to offer promising solutions, because it is far easier to observe that respect 
for political norms and constitutional conventions is eroding in American politics 
than it is to identify all of the reasons why. Contributing factors likely include the 
transformation of the public sphere through old and new media, demographic 
changes in the country and their implications for the Republican Party, gerrymander-
ing on technological steroids, and the increased clustering of Democrats in urban 
areas and Republicans in rural areas. But a responsible examination of the issue is 
beyond the scope of this Essay, which can offer only modest suggestions in closing 
for managing the corrosive conduct of President Trump and the flouting of norms 
and conventions more generally. 
It is essential that the President be called out for his disregard of political norms 
and constitutional conventions each and every time he disrespects them. Many indi-
viduals and institutions have a role to play. They include, first and foremost, mem-
bers of Mr. Trump’s own political party,125 but they also include members of the 
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opposition party, the mainstream news media (which must seek to overcome its own 
partial polarization), the courts in appropriate ways in cases properly before them, 
the institutions that constitute civil society, legal academics, ordinary citizens, and 
friends of the United States abroad in the various institutional roles they occupy. 
It is also important for all of the above actors and institutions to try to persuade 
Americans that political norms and constitutional conventions are good for the health 
of the American constitutional system, and so Democrats and Republicans alike 
should push for them.126 In this regard, admissions against political interest can po-
tentially be helpful. Democrats could model such behavior by, for example, opposing 
faithless electors and future Court packing, and by condemning liberals who advo-
cate (or joke about) violence against the President, his family, his supporters, or any 
Republican politician.127 Republicans might consider whether certain matters are so 
important to the long-term health of the American constitutional system that standing 
up for them is worth the cost of potentially undermining parts of their current legis-
lative agenda by holding the President to account for his most egregious misconduct.  
Looking beyond our shores, it is imperative that President Trump’s troubling re-
lationship with political norms and constitutional conventions not migrate abroad. 
Rather than serving as a model of political behavior for emulation elsewhere, it is at 
least possible that President Trump is setting a series of “negative precedents” that 
other countries will reject.128 The results of the most recent French and English elec-
tions may be at least partially explicable in such terms.129  
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 Most importantly, it is critical for Americans to vote their displeasure with 
President Trump’s conduct if he does not change his behavior, as he appears unlikely 
to do. Indeed, the 2018 midterm elections and the 2020 presidential primaries and 
general election may be, at least in part, a verdict on whether President Trump will 
be remembered as having violated certain political norms and constitutional conven-
tions or as having succeeded in terminating them. There is a huge difference between 
a constitutional regime in which there are norms and conventions based on role that 
are sometimes or even often violated by elected officials and a regime in which these 
norms and conventions are simply thought not to exist.130 
Recent political events can make it difficult for Americans who value political 
norms and constitutional conventions, as well as the governmental institutions and 
constitutional system they help sustain, to believe in the concept of just deserts. Good 
things have recently happened to American politicians who have treated such norms, 
conventions, and institutions badly. But the jury is still out on how successful 
President Trump will be in eroding political norms and constitutional conventions; 
his low approval ratings since taking office may suggest that there is reason for 
hope.131 His political base seems to love his behavior; they view him as “shaking 
things up.”132 Other Americans have become disturbed by that phrase—for them it 
brings to mind the mixing together of powerful chemicals in order to cause an explo-
sion. All Americans might bear in mind that the President’s base alone is not large 
enough to win another election, even with the rural favoritism that is baked into the 
Electoral College.133 Desert sometimes operates within a longer time horizon than a 
few years. More to the point, so does the hard work and struggle of sustaining a 
constitutional democracy.  
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